Paper Summary:

This paper discusses and analyzes Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy regarding the difference between saying and showing in the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". The author explains that although the exact definition of a tractarian object is rather vague it is important for us to understand.

From the Paper:

"Wittgenstein begins the Tractatus by establishing the world as "all that is the case," determined by its existence as all the facts which are the case. The 'logical space,' which consists of both that which is the case and that which is possible, is subsequently posited as the foundation from which the relationship of picture theory is explicated. A 'state of affairs' is a combination of elementary tractarian objects that are possible 'constituents' of the 'fact' as 'what is the case'. This ontological definition of the world as 'facts' which are composed of objects that relate to one another serves to illustrate the distinctions that will create the correspondence necessary between the world and our linguistic pictures of it. The exact definition of a tractarian object is vague at best, but should be understood as the most basic, elementary aspect of things to which we may refer. Objects are contained within the structural arrangement of relationships in the form of 'facts' as actual and possible dictate. These remarks are utilized to show the manner in which a picture represents that which it pictures; elements of structure, form and content stand as the criteria by which the correspondence is enacted. The simple parts of the picture are the things or objects it depicts. "In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects." These elements are arranged "in a determinate way" with relation to one another. Pictures are not only composed of elements, but depict a specific determination of those elements' relationship to one another, which he declares is a 'fact'. This demonstrates that a picture has both a structure and a content which relates to that which it depicts: it reflects the manner in which particular things are related to one another by relating the pictorial elements that represent those particular things. Wittgenstein continues, "[l]et us call this connexion[sic] of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture". If the structure of a picture is the relationship between its elements, the possible structures constitute the form: "form is the possibility of structure". This possibility is a representational possibility in all the manifold arrangements of the elements of that picture. Thus, Wittgenstein uses 'pictorial form' to describe the way the form of a picture is all the possibilities of connecting the elements contained therein, through structures that represent the possible ways the things that the elements stand for can be arranged. "Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture." A picture, therefore, shows a particular possible state of affairs by enacting one specific way of structurally connecting the elements. The pictorial form is exactly that which it has in common with reality, correctly or incorrectly. Therefore, the form is the limit of the possible ways of combining objects in relationships, limited as that which it represents."

Sample of Sources Used:

• Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. Routledge: New York, NY. 2005.

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