From the Paper
"The following research compares and contrasts three essays: "The Crito", by Plato; "Civil Disobedience", by Henry David Thoreau; and "Letter from Birmingham Jail", by Martin Luther King Jr. Socrates, Thoreau and King each addressed issues of freedom, human rights, and individual rights vs. state rights. Each philosopher was accused of having transgressed certain established codes set up by the state.

Socrates was imprisoned "on charges of corrupting youth and believing in gods other than the state's divinities". In his dialogues with Crito, he explores the nature of the ideal state and the individual in opposition to the goals established by the higher authorities. Plato has come to him in prison to urge him to escape, but Socrates' final resolve is not to challenge an authority which he has submitted to by virtue of ... "

From the Paper
"Glenn Tinder, in his work Political Thinking: The Perennial Questions, is as much about the philosophy of life as it is about the philosophy of politics. It is a book concerned not only with the major questions of politics but the major questions of life--the nature of human existence, good and evil, death. Tinder means to help himself and his readers reconsider the very nature of thought itself, to learn or relearn how to think.

What gives Tinder's book its special strength, aside from the fact that he does inspire fresh thoughts about life and politics, is the humility with which he approaches his monumental subjects.

He writes, for example, that "the lack of finality" in his book with respect to the perennial questions "is connected with the primary intent of the book. My purpose is to provide an ... "

Abstract
This paper details the psychological theory of Abraham Maslow. The paper discusses his hierarchy of needs, listing each need and providing examples, as well as showing how the hierarchy is built. There is an expanded section detailing what is meant by self-actualization as well as what Maslow called "peak experiences." A full listing of the B-values are given, as well as numerous other traits and characteristics of self-actualized people. Also explained are Maslow's other hypothesized needs, such as the cognitive, aesthetic, and neurotic needs, and how these all interact with his hierarchy of needs. The paper introduces Maslow as a visionary and pioneer of humanistic psychology who came from a world dominated by psychoanalysis and behaviorism and emerged to provide the world with a more positive, instructional, and human view of mankind and his place in nature.

From the Paper
"These theories shared in common an approach to understanding human nature and behavior that were based directly outside the subjective needs, beliefs, and values of the individual. In grossly simplified terms, the individual was viewed either as a locus in the environment where current stimuli reacted with past reinforced behavior patterns to produce a response or as an almost helpless entity, where deep in the primitive recesses of the human brain a battle was fought for psychological control. Where forces of the good "superego" were beating back the evil armies of the "id" (sex and aggression) and whichever side was winning the battle at any given time would manifest itself in the person's overt behavior. Abraham Maslow was a visionary who pioneered the field of "humanistic" psychology. Aptly named because its primary goal was to center the field of psychology around the individual person to treat them as wanting, feeling, needing, spiritual, and unique beings and to guise psychological theory in terms that took this into account."

Tags:clinical, gestalt, personality, rogers, theorist, therapy, values

Abstract
The paper discusses philosopher David Hume's argument that there cannot be any genuine knowledge of the world other than what we are perceiving at that very moment. Hume argues that ideas are present in the mind and while they are produced by reality, they are copies of reality and not reality itself. The paper analyzes Hume's opinion that knowledge is a product of the mind and non-existent in the outer world.

From the Paper
"Hume begins by noting that "all reasoning concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect" (Hume 458). Hume then rejects cause and effect as an explanation for matters of fact. As Hume says, "Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects" (Hume 459). Cause and effect then, has its basis in past experience and cannot be arrived at in any other way. Thus, reason is not enough to determine a cause and effect, experience must also be used. Cause and effect then, is not a theory that offers an explanation of how knowledge can exist outside of the mind. Hume argues instead that repeated experience gives us "habit" so that if we see one thing, we automatically associate it with another, and in this way we come to understand things without experiencing them."

Tags:memory, thoughts, ideas, impressions

Abstract
This paper explains that philosopher Donna Jeanne Haraway draws from the tradition of Louis Althusser and Martin Heidegger to develop her hypotheses outlining the nature of the interspecies relationship between people and animal or "hailing". As interpreted by Althusser and Heidegger, the author relates that "hail", which is from the archaic word interpellate, is given an additional meaning by Haraway. Based on Haraway's work, the paper concludes that the "hailing" of animals call people to account for the way they affect the lives of animals, and the "hailing" of people call animals to a close, inseparable, interspecies relationship bound within the structure of human society.

From the Paper
"Haraway adds to these two meanings of hail a third, the more conventional meaning of interpellation. Animals hail people to "account for the regimes in which they and we must live", and by doing so, they challenge people to justify the practices of society which create the circumstances of life that animals and people must live in. The effect of the hail is threefold: firstly, humans hail animals, creating a subject out of animals by the hail, bringing animals into our social discourse of power."

Tags:interpellate, primatology, relationships, political, narrative

Abstract
This paper examines how Martin Heidegger, in "Being and Time", examines the existential structures with which Dasein (being) interacts in order to reveal their unification as a structural whole. The paper points out that the phenomenon of 'care' underlies the structural totality of Dasein's being-in-the-world as the fundamental interpretation of itself, through which it is disclosed as being-ahead-of-itself. Furthermore, the state-of-mind of anxiety discloses Dasein's turning away from itself in its 'fallenness' into the world, only to turn back toward itself to realize the possibility of authentic being, as opposed to the inauthentic being provided by the everyday interpretation of Dasein. The primordial interpretation of Dasein's being as care allows the primary differentiation of possibilities, which are enacted through a care structure that both underlies and inhabits existence, facticity and 'fallenness'. The paper concludes that these existential structures are unified through the care structure to delimit an essential definition of the basic state of that entity to which Being is an issue.

From the Paper
"The phenomenon of 'care' underlies the structural totality of Dasein's Being-in-the-world as the fundamental interpretation of itself, through which it is disclosed as being-ahead-of-itself. Martin Heidegger, in Being and Time, examines the existential structures that Dasein, as that entity to which its Being is an issue, interacts with to reveal their unification as a structural whole, within which Dasein manifests as a Being-possible. The state-of-mind of anxiety discloses Dasein's turning away from itself in its 'fallenness' into the world, only to turn back toward itself to realize the possibility of authentic Being, as opposed to the inauthentic Being provided by the everyday interpretation of Dasein. The actualization of any possibilities requires that Dasein exist ahead-of-itself in projecting its Being into those possibilities. The primordial interpretation of Dasein's Being as care allows the primary differentiation of possibilities, which are enacted through a care structure that both underlies and inhabits existence, facticity and 'fallenness'. These existential structures are unified through the care structure to delimit an essential definition of the basic state of that entity to which Being is an issue."

Tags:Dasein, being-in-the-world, existential, existentialism, ontology

Abstract
This paper examines Heidegger's description of factical life experience as attitudinal, in that it indifferently asserts relational meanings as significance. In comparison, it takes a look at his examination of how the Christian life experience stands indifferently towards such indifference. The paper points out that, in factical life, the surrounding world tends to dictate in its immediacy an attitude of the significance of objects that presupposes experience, whereas the Christian life experience of 'having become' inhabits a futurity that exists in both time and history in a manner that factical life cannot. The paper maintains that the primordial Christian lives both time and history in a manner which reduces the significances of factical life to incidental temporality. The paper concludes that this attitude engenders a sense of anguish in its oppositions, which reinforces itself as the 'how', or manner in which Dasein embraces being at the phenomenological point of experience.

From the Paper
"Factical life experience is attitudinal in that its Dasein, or being-in-the-world, is determined by a relationship with experience that is presupposed by a web of significances, which refer solely to the surrounding material world. "'Attitude' is a relation to objects in which the conduct is absorbed in the material complex". There exists only an interest in the content, the matter that exists as the material component of experience, which draws the focus away from the experiential self. Attitude is as much a cognitive position toward the world as objects, as it is a dictation of the relationship to the material complex, not as self, but as an object dictated by the significances of the surrounding world. The 'how' of factical life is 'fallen' into because it 'worlds'; the attitude of significance it is not generated from Dasein, rather, it is a living in history. The attitude of significance subsumes the 'how' and hides the historicity of the material complex. History, as enacted by science, forms an objective material complex that factical life experience takes up as 'what actually happened'; a structure of attitudinal foreconceptions of objects which hold significance only with regard to the axiomatic foundations of science as enacted through history. Relational meaning and their enactment are directed by the surrounding world, instead of either being self-generated through Dasein or by the experience itself. Factical Dasein is inserted into factical life to secure itself either against, with, or for history, reducing both Dasein and history to the status of objects in service to factical life's attitudinal relationship to experience. "The concerned Dasein is only an object-segment from a great whole object (from the entire objective historical happening)". Living-in-the-world is constructed objectively in a historical context that is re-interpreted by the tendency of life to 'fall away' attitudinally into preconceptions of objects as significance."

Tags:phenomenology, religion, philosophy, Dasein

Abstract
This paper analyzes Martin Heidegger's essay "The Concept of Time", which examines the nature of time and his concept of authentic being-in-the-world, or "Dasein". The paper takes a look at Heidegger's inquiry into prevalent notions of 'what time is' , his attempt to account for the continuity of existence experienced by human beings, and subsequently into the temporality of time. Ultimately, the paper addresses the idea that "Dasein", in its ability to interpret its own being, may run ahead to the indeterminate certainty of its own non-existence to expose the entirety of its own time, rendering it accessible in its authenticity as 'how', not simply 'what' or 'when'.

From the Paper
"Heidegger observes that even the everyday is running ahead to the future, albeit in an inauthentic manner that loses its own past. "The future is now that to which care clings--not the authentic, futural being of the past, but the future that the present itself cultivates for itself as its own." The present constantly jumps ahead to the next present 'now' in a succession of events analogous to its facticity of objectively rendered significances. The 'fallenness' of Dasein into everydayness causes it to appropriate an irretrievability of the past through the everyday clinging to the present. Authentic history is lost in the material obsession with the now of the present as present: the past is inaccessible as material events that are no longer present. "Because this history and temporality of the present utterly fail to attain the past, they merely have another present." In the everyday experience of present as simultaneity of 'what'-points in space, the past is rendered as a present forever separate from the immediate present. The 'how' that opens from Dasein's being futural gives access to authentic past in the ability to repeat the experience in its interpretation instead of its transient materiality."

Tags:Dasein, being-futural, authentic, being-in-the-world, temporal, modern, philosophy

Abstract
This paper examines Martin Heidegger's view, in his essay "Plato's Sophist", of the Aristotelian concepts of "conscience" and "know-how". The paper points out that Heidegger delimits these concepts as modes of disclosure, to reveal the manner in which their deliberation of beings relates to their agent and his experience of "being in the world". "Know-how" concerns itself primarily with the production of objects as form, which are then removed from its sphere of influence to realize their being through proper use. "Conscience" takes as its object life itself, and its dileberations of "excellence" are integrated into the agent. The paper maintains that, according to Heidegger, this creates a transparency of action and "being in the world" (Dasein) that must constantly reassert itself to resist life's natural tendency toward concealment. The paper concludes that the fundamental difference between these two modes of disclosure can be seen in their relationship to "excellence" and the manner in which their products are manifested.

From the Paper
"The characteristic of excellence ( ) finds its expression differently in (know-how) and (conscience), revealing a primary distinction between these two modes of disclosure. While both direct themselves toward the becoming of beings which 'may be otherwise', stands beside ( ) its productions, whereas integrates its productions. Excellence ( ) is to manifest the perfection inherently possible to beings, which requires a degree of certitude. T finds this possible, within its limits of disclosure, while can never have such. Though the authentic being of an object is inaccessible to because it does not participate in its use, perfection of form ( ) may be reached through its fundamental methodology. As a set of principles drawn from a multiplicity of experiences, the process of trial and error creates a certainty that the form ( ) has achieved its maximum potential. As with the scientific method, the more experiments that reinforce a theory, the more accurate a representation of reality it is assumed to be. Any error results in a reworking of the theory to include such information, therefore increasing its accuracy ( ). "But in the case of , on the contrary, where it is a matter of a deliberation whose theme is the proper Being of Dasein, every mistake is a personal shortcoming". Errors do not open up the possibility of a higher degree of knowledge; rather, they are a complete corruption of proper being. Every deliberation of is in the form of an either/or proposition: it cannot have an end ( ) of excellence ( ) because it is excellence ( ) in its constant becoming. "The [origin] with which has to do is the action itself. And the which is taken into consideration in is the action itself". Thus, within , that which is uncovered remains uncovered through the constant struggle which orients it always toward its continuous expression in the actions ( ) of authentic Dasein. Conscience may be distorted by the desires and their usurpation of Dasein, but it can never be forgotten."

Tags:Dasein, Aristotle, excellence, form

Abstract
This paper relates that F. L. G. Frege's rejection of psychologism states that, to understand logic one, must be strictly objective and deny subjective personal ideas to grasp fully the truth in logic. The author points out that Frege believed that one can grasp a thought but not create it because logical thoughts resided in the 'third realm' where everything is objective and is there to be discovered, independent of being grasped by anyone. The paper relates that, although Frege suggests language as the medium between thoughts and senses, he does not tell how they are connected. The author underscores that M. A. E. Dummett explains that a weakness of Frege is that he used a very rigid dichotomy of the concepts of objective or subjective. The paper concludes that Dummett's idea that one can reject both Platonism and psychologism by the notion of inter-subjectivity and language limits Frege's anti-psychologism argument.

From the Paper
"According to Frege, if thought were "in the mind," it, like ideas, could not be communicated to one another; thus sliding into a relativistic notion of "truth". Frege understood 'thought'--"as an abstract structured entity constituted by senses which can be semantically assessed as true or as false, and it can be grasped- all which are objective elements not associated with psychological elements" (Cohen, 1998). Frege's central argument was that mathematics and logic are not a part of psychology, and that the objects and laws of mathematics are not explained by psychological observations or results. His examples of objective, non-psychological entities are numbers, for instance 2 + 3 = 5. Numbers are not ideas since they are the same for all people thus this leads Frege to conclude that a content of a sentence cannot be a mental image."

Tags:platonism, inter-subjectivity, objective, subjective, language